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ABSTRACT 
This paper identifies some of the forces that influence 
the impact of air transportation on regional connectivity 
and economic productivity in the United States.  In light 
of recent threats to the financial viability of the airline 
industry, a conceptual model has been developed to 
highlight the interdependence of the national economy 
and the air transportation system.  These complex 
relationships are identified using regional economic and 
social indicators combined with airline traffic and 
financial data.  The changes in supply and demand for 
air travel after the deregulation of the airline industry in 
1978—as well as the challenges faced after the attacks 
of September 11, 2001—are used to frame this 
discussion. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rapid increase in the use of air transportation since 
deregulation in 1978, coupled with the unprecedented 
financial crisis in the airline industry after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks raises questions on how 
vulnerable the nation is to significant interruptions to its 
air transportation system.  In an attempt to better 
understand its national importance, this paper examines 
some aspects of how the air transportation system has 
had an impact on the economic structure and social 
behavior in the United States.   
To help identify these economic and social impacts, a 
conceptual model of these interdependencies was 
developed to structure the analysis of this paper.  In 
light of this framework, two major changes in the air 
transportation system are evaluated.  The first change 
was the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978.  
Fundamental changes in airline services occurred after 
the Civil Aeronautics Board eliminated restrictions on 
routes and fares.  The second major change was the 
dramatic downturn in the US airline industry following 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.  Although revenues 
had been declining at the major airlines well before the 
9/11 attacks, the subsequent changes in travel behavior 
led to a reduction in national air transportation capacity 
by 10 to 20 percent in just a matter of weeks.  This 
dramatic change has highlighted the key 
interdependencies between the economy and the airline 
industry.   
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of the relationship 
between the economy and the air transportation system.  
The model sets up the external relationship between the 
economy (shown in the upper left corner) and the air 
transportation system (shaded in gray on the lower 
right).  The economy generates a Travel Need which 
creates the Demand for air transportation services.  The 
Supply of air transportation services, in turn, provides 
an Economic Enabling Effect that creates access to 
people, markets, ideas and capital and thus enables the 
economy to function at a regional or national level.  
These relationships between Supply, Demand, and the 
Economy illustrate the basic macro functionality of the 
air transportation system.  
The model further illustrates how the internal structure 
of the Air Transportation System (gray box) is based on 
the profitability of the airline industry.  This internal 
feedback loop connects the demand for air travel to 
airline revenues and the supply of air transportation.  
Airlines control the Supply of air transportation by 
modifying Prices, Networks, and Schedules, which in 
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Figure 1: Relationship between the economy, air travel demand, and airline supply. rn have a major impact on the Demand for air 
ansportation services. 
inally, the model also shows the traditional financial 
lationships between the economy and the airline 
dustry (shown in dashed lines).  The Economy 
fluences the ability of the Airlines to secure capital 
quity and finance Debt.  Employment and spending by 
e airlines, in turn, have Direct, Indirect, and Induced 
pacts on the economy. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMY  
AND THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
ost analyses on the economic impact of air 
ansportation typically only address the direct financial 
ffects from aviation employment and spending.  The 
AA has estimated that the US aviation industry 
ccounts for some 11.6 million direct, indirect, and 
duced jobs and over $316 billion dollars in 
arnings.1,2 These methods, however, may 
nderestimate the true impact of air transportation by 
iling to take into account the Enabling Effects of air 
ansportation and how high quality air connectivity 
ffects access to markets, capital, ideas, and people. 
o examine the relationship between the economy and 
e air transportation system, a review of economic and 
cial trends in the US since deregulation was 
conducted.  Increases in air travel, GDP growth, 
population geography, and travel behavior were 
analyzed. 
Growth in air travel 
In order to fully document the changes in the supply of 
air transportation, the growth in passenger traffic data, 
airline capacity and airline fleets were analyzed.  The 
growth in domestic capacity was measured in terms of 
Available Seat Miles (ASMs), while Revenue 
Passenger Miles (RPMs) were used to measure traffic.3 
Figure 2 shows that RPMs grew considerably faster 
after deregulation than in the period between 1954 and 
1978.  Between 1954 and 1978 US domestic RPMs 
grew at an average rate of 750 million RPMs per year.  
Between 1978 and 2000, RPMs grew at average rate of 
1.8 billion RPMs per year.  Reflecting this increase in 
demand, Figure 3 shows that the domestic scheduled 
ASMs increased from 300 billion in 1978 to over 700 
billion by 2000. Figure 4 shows that the growth in 
capacity and traffic was achieved by a major increase in 
the size of airline fleets.  The number of aircraft used in 
commercial airline service increased from 2,000 aircraft 
to over 7,000 aircraft between 1978 and 1995.   
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Figure 2:  RPM Trends before and after 
deregulation.  Source: BEA and BTS OAI data. 
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Figure 3:  Growth in domestic travel, 1954-2001.4  
Source: ATA data. 
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Figure 4:  Growth of the US Commercial Airplane 
Fleet, 1965-1995.  Source: US BTS OAI data. 
 
Growth in Economic Activity 
The relationship between air travel and economic 
growth was explored by analyzing increases in the US 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) alongside the growth of 
domestic air travel.  Constant 1996 dollars were used to 
measure the relative increase in GDP between 1954 and 
2001, while air travel was measured using Revenue 
Passenger Miles (RPMs).  Figure 5 shows that the 
growth of air traffic has historically tracked with the 
rise in GDP, and that rises in enplanements followed 
those for GDP. 
The annual percentage change in RPMs and GDP was 
also analyzed in order to further investigate this 
relationship.  Figure 6 confirms that there was a close 
correlation between annual economic growth and air 
travel after deregulation. Prior to deregulation, the 
annual change in RPMs also tracked the GDP—but not 
as closely. 
The demand for air transportation services appears to be 
inherently related to economic activity.  In general, a 
poorly performing economy will result in less 
circulation of goods and services and a reduction in 
personal income.  The corresponding effect on air travel 
would involve some reduced demand for discretionary 
business and social trips such as vacations or visits to 
friends.  Access to high quality air transportation is also 
thought to be a stimulant to economic growth through 
the Enabling Effect of access to markets, people, ideas, 
and capital.  Since both the Travel Need and Enabling 
Effect are present in the interaction between the 
Economy and the Air Transportation System (Fig 1), it 
is difficult to de-couple these effects in most measures 
of system performance.     
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Figure 5:  Growth in GDP and RPMs.  Source: US 
BEA and BTS data. 
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Figure 6:  Annual percentage change in GDP and 
Domestic RPMs, 1965-2001.  Source: US BEA and 
BTS data. 
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Changes in Regional Geography 
To examine how air transportation may have affected 
regional population and economic growth, an analysis 
of regional economic and air traffic data was 
conducted.  Economic census data on population 
growth and Per Capita Personal Income (PCIP) at the 
state level was combined with the Department of 
Transportation 10% air traveler coupon database.  The 
number of airline trips per capita was also used to 
normalize the data for the size of each state. 
Figure 7 illustrates the percentage change in air traffic 
over the percentage change in population between 1980 
and 2000 (normalized to 1980 levels).  Figure 9 shows 
a comparison of the change in per capita personal 
income over air traffic.  Nationally,5 there was a 24 
percent growth in population and a 190 percent growth 
in PCIP between 1980 and 2000.  In comparison, air 
travel by 136 percent on average. 
In general, some of the faster-growing locations—by 
population and PCIP—in the West and Southeast were 
also associated with higher utilization of air travel.  
Although Nevada and Arizona had very high rates of 
population growth and air travel, they had some of the 
lowest increases in PCIP versus air travel.  This is 
thought to be due to the rapid growth of the tourism 
industry and retirement relocations that stimulated air 
traffic demand but which generated relatively low-
paying service jobs. 
Massachusetts had the highest increase in PCIP 
between 1980 and 2000, but its air traffic only doubled 
over the same period.  This reflects the limits of the Air 
Transportation Infrastructure.  As Boston Logan 
International Airport (BOS) reached saturation, traffic 
increased at regional airports in Manchester, New 
Hampshire (MHT) and Providence, Rode Island (PVD).  
For example New Hampshire had low population and 
high PCIP growth, but an unusually high traffic 
increase of over 2,300 percent. When these states were 
grouped together to account for the regional the growth 
of air travel fell in line with the national average.  
Regional effects can also explain the other states with 
anomalously high air traffic growth—with Baltimore, 
Maryland (BWI) supporting the Washington DC-
Northern Virginia region and Newark, New Jersey 
(EWR) supporting the New York city market. 
While this analysis illustrates how the regional 
influence of air transportation infrastructure stretches 
across state borders, it also shows some evidence that 
the air transportation is related to the location of 
economic growth. 
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Figure 7:  Change in state population vs. air traffic, 
1980-2000.  Source: US BEA REIS and DOT 10% 
coupon data. 
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Figure 8: Change in per capita personal income vs. 
air traffic.  Source: US BEA REIS and DOT 10% 
coupon data. 
Changes in the characteristics of Air Travel 
To more closely examine the changes in the use of air 
transportation, survey data on long-distance travel was 
examined.  The data was collected from a periodic 
personal travel survey conducted by the US Department 
of Transportation.6   
Figure 10 shows the rapid rise in the reported number 
of long distance (greater than 100 miles) trips by air.  
While overall long-distance air travel has gone up, the 
ratio of work to non-work trips has also changed.  In 
1972, less than 40 percent of trips were taken for non 
work-related purposes, but this had increased to 70 
percent by 1990.  
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The increase in the number of non-work related trips 
indicates that the role of the air transportation system 
has changed since deregulation.  The enhanced 
connectivity and accessibility of the air transportation 
system appears to have enabled air transportation to be 
more fully integrated into the social fabric of the nation.  
The availability of cheaper airfares and frequent service 
made it easier for people to relocate for economic or 
other opportunities while still maintaining close 
relationships with family and friends.  
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Figure 9:  Growth in Long-distance trips by 
airplane, 1972-1995.   Source: US DOT NPTS. 
CHANGES IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY  
AFTER DEREGULATION 
Two of the major changes in the airline industry after 
deregulation included the implementation of hub-and-
spoke route networks and yield management systems.  
An analysis of these changes was conducted to 
investigate how airline business practices have 
influenced the social and economic trends seen 
previously. 
Development of Hub-and-spoke Networks 
To more closely look at the impacts of airline hubs, an 
analysis of the growth at one airport was conducted.  
During 2001, Atlanta’s Hartsfield International Airport 
was the busiest airport in the world in terms of 
enplanements (75.8 million passengers), and the second 
busiest in terms of aircraft operations (890,000 
movements).  As shown in Figure 10, Atlanta is a large 
transfer hub for Delta Airlines and its regional 
affiliates.  They operated 850 flights per day to 133 
destinations in the contiguous United States on an 
average day during Summer 2000; flights to and from 
Atlanta accounted for 40 percent of the Delta’s entire 
domestic operations.  
To show the evolution of the hub and the growth of the 
highly connected hub-and-spoke bank structure, OAG 
flight schedule data for all carriers at Atlanta was 
analyzed at selected intervals between 1965 and 2000.  
Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of the banking 
structure using a histogram of scheduled flight arrivals 
in 15-minute increments throughout the day.   
The plot for an average day in 1965 shows a 
concentration of scheduled flights around the mid-
morning and late afternoon periods.  In 1978, the 
development of the bank structure is already starting to 
be evident.  The banking structure can be identified in 
the 1986 analysis by the high peaking of flights—
between 25 and 40 flights per 15-minute period, 
although the presence of two major airline hubs (Delta 
and Eastern) shows the effect of competition at that 
time.  The full nine-bank structure had been clearly 
developed by 2000. 
The concentration of scheduled flight arrivals into 
narrow time windows is indicative of a high level of 
coordination to minimize scheduled travel time.  Hub-
and-spoke service patterns also enabled airlines to 
consolidate discrete levels of demand and offer more 
frequent services.  These increases in connectivity 
presumably enabled people to better incorporate travel 
into their business and social activity patterns.  It is 
thought to have influenced the changes in population 
distribution and other economic activities. 
Figure 10.  Delta’s domestic route network in the 
Summer 2000, with the Atlanta hub indicated.  
Source: OAG data.  
 
Yield Management 
The impact of yield management practices was 
analyzed at the industry level by looking at historical 
data on airline revenue and traffic.  Airline yields (the 
average price paid per mile) were examined using 
constant (1978) dollars in order to account for inflation. 
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Figure 11: Evolution of hub-and-spoke service pattern at Atlanta, 1965-2000.  Histogram shows scheduled 
nonstop arrivals for all airlines within 15-minute periods on an average summer weekday.      Source: 
Official Airline Guide data. Figure 12 shows that the average yield has been 
continually declining since the 1960s, although this 
decline slowed in the 1990s.  At the same time, Figure 
13 shows that the average system load factors increased 
from about 60 percent in 1978 up to 72 percent in 2000.  
This indicates that on average, airplanes had more seats 
filled and were thus generating more revenue per flight.  
Yield management has been largely responsible for the 
increasing load factors by enabling airlines to use a 
spectrum of fares to stimulate travel demand.  By 
enabling airlines to sell-off excess seat inventory while 
maintaining the revenue from passengers willing to pay 
higher fares, yield management systems contributed to 
airline profitability.  However, in the late 1990’s, yield 
management practices became more aggressive—
driven in part by the strong economy and investor 
expectations.  The spread between highest and lowest 
fares has increased to unprecedented levels in recent 
years, however, and these historically high load factors 
have contributed to operational and consumer 
satisfaction problems.   
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Figure 12: Decline in average industry yields 
(constant 1978 dollars).  Source: ATA data. 
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Figure 13:  Average domestic load factors.  Source: 
ATA data. 
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INDUSTRY CHALLENGES SINCE 9/11 
The softening of demand both prior to and after 9/11, 
coupled with the economic and operational shocks that 
occurred in the wake of the terrorist attacks, have 
created unprecedented challenges for the domestic and 
international airline industry.  These will be discussed 
briefly in this section. 
Airline Profitability 
As discussed above, the demand for air transportation is 
strongly correlated with the overall economic situation.  
As a consequence, the profitability of the industry has 
historically been cyclic.  This can be seen in Figure 15, 
which depicts the US Airline Industry net profits/losses 
(in current-year dollars).  Since deregulation in 1978, 
the industry has exhibited an exponentially growing 
oscillatory profit/loss behavior.  
In the four quarters following the 9/11 attacks, the three 
largest US carriers collectively lost over $5.3 billion 
dollars.7  Figure 16 shows the reported quarterly 
statements for three major US airlines (America, Delta, 
United) as well as Southwest Airlines.  For the major 
airlines, losses began in the third and fourth quarters of 
2000, and this reflected the softening economy.  The 
losses for the major carriers increased significantly after 
the 9/11 attacks even after the $5 billion dollars in cash 
infusions from the Air Transportation Stabilization 
Board that were intended to cover the costs of the 
national system shutdown.  In marked contrast, 
Southwest Airlines was one of the only major carriers 
to remain profitable following the events of 9/11.   
While US carriers have experienced losses during 
periods of recessions, the magnitude of the current 
losses for the major carriers (excluding Southwest) is 
clearly unprecedented.  The coupling of the normal 
cyclic behavior with the post 9/11 shock has put the 
industry in a period of extreme loss.  The current loss 
rate is about $8 billion dollars per year.   
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Figure 15: Annual Profit and loss of Domestic US 
Carriers.  Source: ATA data. 
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Figure 16: Recent profits of the three largest US 
carriers and Southwest.  Source: ATA data. 
Post 9/11 Recovery 
The cash infusion and industry loans being provided as 
part of the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act were designed to recover some of the costs and loss 
of revenue associated with the shutdown of national 
airspace after 9/11.  Figure 17 shows a notional 
representation of possible recovery trajectories that 
could apply to individual airlines or the industry as a 
whole.   
Figure 17 shows the unit revenue in Revenue per 
Available Seat Mile (RASM) and unit costs in Cost per 
Available Seat Mile (CASM) over time.  Prior to 9/11, 
RASMs were trending down due to softening demand 
and yields, while CASMs were trending upwards due to 
increased labor costs, increased fuel costs, debt burden 
and other operational costs.  During the period between 
9/11 and 9/13, no revenues were received due to 
shutdown of US airspace.  When operations resumed, 
the CASMs were higher due to a number of factors, 
including increased security and insurance costs.  
RASMs were down significantly due to shaken public 
confidence in air travel.   
Figure 17 illustrate three potential recovery trajectories 
following 9/11.  In the Quick Recovery trajectory, the 
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RASMs recover quickly and the carrier returns to 
profitability. Southwest Airlines appears to have 
followed the Quick Recovery trajectory.  The remainder 
of the major US air carriers appears to either be on the 
Slow Recovery or Insolvency trajectories, as their 
RASMs have not recovered to match their increased 
CASMs. 
Figure 18 illustrates that while the domestic ASMs 
initially dropped about 15 percent after 9/11, the 
system-wide capacity in August 2002 was still about 
7.5 percent below the previous year.  Figure 19 shows 
that the passenger RPM traffic is also down about 7.3 
percent.  Figure 20 shows that average load factors 
during 2002 have been restored to previous levels.  It 
appears that revenue management systems and capacity 
reductions have been successful at restoring load 
factors to pre-9/11 levels.  The continuing losses in the 
airline industry, however, show that the nature of the 
revenues has clearly changed. 
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$/ASM Security costs
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Figure 17: Potential industry recovery trajectories 
after 9/11. 
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Figure 18: Domestic capacity, 2000-2002.  Source: 
ATA data. 
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Figure 19: Domestic traffic, 2000-2002.  Source: ATA 
data. 
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Figure 20: Domestic average load factors, 2000-
2002.  Source: Airline financial reports. 
Investor Confidence 
The investment capital markets have recognized that 
the major US network airlines are on the Slow Recovery 
or Insolvency trajectories, while the low cost carriers 
such as Southwest and JetBlue are on the Quick 
Recovery trajectories.  This is reflected in Figure 21, 
which shows that Southwest Airlines market 
capitalization was greater than the rest of the industry 
combined and that JetBlue had a valuation 10 times 
greater than that of United Airlines.  
Figure 22 shows the resulting imbalance in relative 
market share and market capitalization. Southwest has 
over 50% of the market capitalization but only abut 
10% of the market share.  Conversely American, 
United, and Delta have among the largest traffic shares, 
but some of the lowest market capitalization.  This 
indicates that a significant share of the national air 
transportation lift capacity is at severe financial risk. 
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Figure 21: Market capitalization of the US major 
airlines plus JetBlue and ATA on September 4, 
2002.   Source: Yahoo! Finance data. 
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Figure 22: Market Share vs. Market Cap.  Source: 
Yahoo! Finance data and airline news releases. 
KEY QUESTIONS FOR THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY  
As discussed above, the US economy and social 
structure has evolved to depend on a high quality air 
transportation system with a high-density network and a 
spectrum of fares that makes air travel accessible to a 
broad market.  The slow recovery of much of the 
industry after 9/11 has raised a number of key questions 
for the industry and the nation. 
Industry Structure  
How the overall structure of the US airline industry will 
evolve is a key question.  While low cost carriers are 
doing well, they generally operate limited route 
networks and rely less on market segmentation than the 
major network carriers with large hub and spoke 
networks.   If some of the financially stressed major 
carriers fail, one major question is how this would 
affect the overall industry structure and business 
models. 
Changes in the Revenue Paradigm 
While air traffic after 9/11 has largely been restored, the 
downshift in revenues still threatens the industry as a 
whole.  Traditional market segmentation assumptions 
are failing; the existence of low-fare competition on the 
most profitable markets and the dominance of low-
yield, non work-related travel appears to make it 
extremely difficult to increase revenues to more 
sustainable levels.  Pressure from the low-cost, limited 
network carriers is forcing the major network carriers 
away from pricing strategies that reflect the value of the 
network.  If the strong networks that support the 
national economy and quality of lift are to remain 
intact, a new revenue paradigm is clearly necessary. 
Reductions in Operating Costs 
The expanding presence of low-cost carriers continues 
to exert pressure on the major network carriers to 
reduce their operating costs.  More fuel-efficient 
airplanes, optimized scheduling, reduced ticket 
distribution costs, and other technological 
improvements have improved airline productivity since 
deregulation.  Labor remains one area that distinguishes 
the low-cost carries with the US majors, yet it typically 
only accounts for 33% to 40% of the total operating 
costs.   
One strategy is to preserve existing hub networks, but 
to make them more efficient by transforming traditional 
hubs with rolling bank schedules and replacing larger 
aircraft with regional jets.  Rolling bank systems enable 
greater aircraft and gate utilization.  Figure 23 shows 
the shift that American Airlines has made at Dallas-Ft. 
Worth from a highly peaked banking structure to a 
rolling bank.  American Airlines estimates that it will 
gain the equivalent of 17 new aircraft through 
scheduling efficiencies in this structure and also gains 
in labor and gate costs.8  However, these operational 
efficiencies come at the cost of increased passenger 
travel times and may reduce the effective connectivity 
in some city-pair markets.  It is also worth noting that 
the rolling banks are less susceptible to major 
interruptions due to weather or ATC delays, and could 
result in additional operational cost savings.  
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Figure 23: American Airlines conversion to a rolling 
bank schedule at Dallas-Ft. Worth.  Source: 
American Airlines electronic timetable data. 
Impact on Small Markets 
One of the major questions in the potential restructuring 
of the airline industry is the impact on small markets.  If 
the major network carriers cannot price in a manner to 
reflect the value of the high-density networks, then the 
level of service to small markets will drop significantly.   
Airline networks were generally preserved immediately 
after 9/11, although some cities received reduced 
frequencies or down-gauged equipment to regional jets.  
When system-wide capacity was cut by 20 percent after 
9/11, many hub and spoke network carriers simply 
eliminated the last bank of flights in lieu of cutting 
service to cities.  Some airlines did discontinue service  
at smaller airports with little contribution to total 
network revenue, although these communities generally 
have retained access to air service at nearby airports. 
As carriers begin to enter Chapter 11, it is likely that 
service to small markets will be lost or that a significant 
premium will be necessary to retain service. What is 
also unprecedented, however, is that a significant 
fraction of the national air transportation lift capacity is 
at risk.  The business failure of a large network carrier, 
for example, could result in a reduction in the national 
air transportation capacity of up to 20 percent.  With 
airline average load factors already at historically high 
levels, the system would have little capacity to pick up 
the slack.  While such a capacity reduction may be 
absorbable at the national level, it could have severe 
impacts at the local level. There are many cities that are 
only served by one or two carriers, and the 
transportation capacity in these markets could be 
particularly vulnerable to service cutbacks.  
Government Intervention 
One of the major questions which faces the industry is 
the proper role of the government.  Because the Air 
Transportation System is a fundamental component of 
the national transportation infrastructure, the 
government cannot allow the industry to fail at a 
systemic level.  However, the appropriate role for the 
government is unclear.  In addition, it does not appear 
that the loan guarantees provided by the Air 
Transportation Stabilization Board have been effective 
at stabilizing the industry and may have actually had an 
adverse effect by keeping yields down in some markets.   
While a free market approach would eventually reach 
equilibrium in the face of multiple carrier failures or 
cutbacks, there would be major service disruptions due 
to operational difficulties in shifting aircraft and labor 
resources between carriers.  In addition, the market will 
tend to concentrate resources on the most profitable 
markets and reduce or eliminate service to weak 
markets.  This is likely to cause political pressure for 
government action. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified some of the key relationships 
between the economy and the air transportation system 
while focusing on the close interrelationship between 
the airline industry and the supply/demand of air 
transportation.  The dramatic increase in the use and 
characteristics of air travel since deregulation suggests 
that the nation has evolved to have a strong dependence 
on the air transportation system for regional economic 
and social connectivity.   
The US airline industry is facing a period of 
unprecedented stress due to the softening of demand 
and the operational impacts of 9/11.  Most major US 
carriers have been unprofitable over the past year with 
little expectation of profitability in the near future.  
These stresses are forcing a major restructuring of the 
industry, and the end state is unclear.  Much of the US 
air transportation lift capacity is at risk.  The magnitude 
and strategic ramifications of major changes in the Air 
Transportation System to the national economy and 
social quality of life would indicate that some 
government intervention is likely to occur. 
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NOTES 
1 J. Robins Tucker.  “Economic Impact of Civil 
Aviation on the US Economy 2002: Interim Results.”  
Powerpoint.  Federal Aviation Administration.  Air 
Traffic Control Association Conference.  July 9, 2002. 
2 Direct impacts are those from the airlines and other 
primary business in the air transportation system.  
Indirect impacts are those from businesses such as 
hotels or car rental services that are associated with air 
travel.  Induced impacts come from the subsequent 
rounds of spending from the households employed 
directly or indirectly by the aviation industry. 
3 The impact of non-revenue travel such that related to 
frequent flyer programs was not studied. 
4 Only ATA US member airlines are included (Aloha, 
Alaska, America West, American, American Trans Air, 
Continental, Continental Micronesia, Delta, Hawaiian, 
JetBlue, Midwest Express, Northwest, Southwest, 
United, and US Airways). 
5 These analyses excluded Alaska and Hawaii due to 
their reliance on air travel.  Delaware and Idaho were 
excluded due to a lack of good data. 
6 It should be noted that in 1983, the sample size of the 
survey was drastically reduced and may have affected 
the results for that year. 
7 Tucker, 2002. 
8 AMR Corporation, American Unveils Next Set of 
Fundamental Business Changes, Press Release.  August 
13, 2002.  http://www.amrcorp.com/news/ 
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